| Solving Nepal’s Empowerment Crisis - By Dr. Alok K Bohara |
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Solving Nepal’s Empowerment Crisis: Regional Governance and the Mixed Proportional Representation System of Election
Dr. Alok K. Bohara Professor, University of New Mexico September 10, 2002 Extracted from Bohara, Alok K., “Empowerment Crisis: Regional Governance and the Mixed Proportional Representation System of Election,” in Nepal Tomorrow: Voices and Visions, D.B. Gurung (eds.), pages 694, Kathmandu: Koselee Prakashan, 2003, pp. 86-101. ‘If you act like there is no possibility of change, you guarantee that there will be no change.’ Noam Chomsky. A Déjà vuDemocracy arrived in Nepal with a hope to bring personal freedom, economic opportunity, and social justice. But after twelve years of political mayhem and economic mismanagement these dreams remained unrealized for many. Consequently, Kathmandu’s over-importance, its pampered class and its unconcern became the target of resentment for many millions of Nepalis outside the Valley. With a centralized administrative system of government and the ever-powerful one or two parties with elitist mentality at the helm, millions of ethnic and political minorities find themselves unheard, powerless, and impatient. As a reflection on the post-2007 situation, the late Governor of Pyuthan, Pratiman Chand Bohara, captures the same sentiments and frustrations in his diary written fifty years ago. (see Kathmandu Post, June 3, 2001; Kantipur, Shrawan 15, 2002). To put things in perspective, the regional gap Pratiman Bohara describes in his diary is wider than ever even after fifty years. For instance, of the 25 least developed districts ranked based on the criteria such as poverty deprivation, institutional and infrastructure development, women’s empowerment, and natural resources, 17 lies in the Western and Far-Western regions, whereas only one district falls in the Eastern region, a home to many powerful party bosses and the Prime Ministers. Deprived of any full-fledged public university system, the West and the Far-West regions rank at the bottom of various educational indicators too. Frustrated with the narrow definition of Nepal, Pratiman Bohara, also a front-line soldier in the 2007 revolution in and around the Palpa and Butwal area, warns them of a future possible uprising, and urges the new political establishment in Kathmandu to change, devolve, and empower. Many millions of Nepalis today happen to echo a similar voice, and they too are in need for empowerment. Demanding Empowerment Whoever we may blame for the crisis of democracy in Nepal, we have to agree that all Nepalis are in this together. The other point most would accept, one that is the source of many of Nepal’s current problems, is that political and economic power is concentrated in the capital. Such powers must be devolved across the Nepali landscape in a way that the millions of political and ethnic minorities become productive partners in the nation building. We must bring about a new thinking in our political process that allows an increased collective voice and a bargaining power for the ethnic and political minorities, especially those that are outside the valley. With an increased political participation and shared responsibility, the whole society gains. A balance must be struck, however, to avoid unleashing of forces that would threaten our national integrity and unity. A communal harmony is absolutely important. Without the lifeblood of citizen, democracy cannot prosper, and without the empowerment initiatives people will remain detached. It is especially true for a country with such a vast ethnic diversity. Major parties have also failed to stave off criticism for being too elitists. The author identifies four initiatives to enhance empowerment through: (1) social laws, (2) educational opportunities, (3) decentralized regional governments, and (4) an inclusive electoral process. First, for centuries our orthodox society has been very unkind to women and to those who have been labeled as lower caste and untouchable. Social taboos have prevented them from entering the economic mainstream of the society. Strict laws are essential to break these taboos. But the economic benefit can only come if we put in place the anti-discrimination laws in hiring, promotion, and wages based on race, gender, or caste. Second, educational opportunities and fair access to quality public education, and not only the political and employment quotas and handouts, will give suppressed minorities a level playing field. The educational gap that exists between the Eastern and the Western Nepal must be closed. That is, all five regions should have full-fledged public universities. The directions of these autonomous universities should be decided by the regional governments. Further, the country should also invest in five technical regional universities to produce technical workforce. Many smaller academic units scattered all over the country should be consolidated under these regional authorities. Measures should be taken to ensure quality. Third, the political-economic power of the Kathmandu elites must be broken through a constitutional change. The decentralized regional governments will enhance the sense of decision-making power, self-reliance, resource mobilization capacity, and responsibility for the millions of people outside the valley. Fourth, a popular mixed proportional representation method of election instead of the current single-constituency first-past-the-post system, on the other hand, will bring more balance in our representation system, especially in favor of the millions of unheard ethnic and political minorities scattered throughout the Nepali landscape. The point is that the devolutionary measures must consider political-economic, educational, and social empowerments. A decentralized system of regional governments and a reform in our electoral system are essential first steps in resolving the present empowerment crisis. That is, I am arguing for a constitutional reform to incorporate some form of federalism in our political administrative system and a reform in our electoral process, which may just provide a way of peacefully reconciling unity and diversity. The third and fourth points will be elaborated in detail below. What is Devolution? The transition from a command to market economy in the face of the current globalization movement will not succeed unless one recognizes the importance of the decentralized decision making apparatus, both political as well as fiscal. Federalism provides a constitutional mechanism under which a division of task is clearly defined for the central government that acts to focus on common purposes, whereas sub-national level political units become responsible to its own electorate. Almost 40 percent of the world’s population live under some form of federal system (e.g., Brazil, United States, Mexico, India, Germany, Canada, Spain, Belgium, South Africa, Italy, Malaysia, Nigeria, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia). A strict form of federalism puts States or Provinces at par with the center, making both accountable to the Constitution. The US is such an example. The Indian example is somewhat different (quasi-federalism) where the States have many rights but the central government can exercise superior power. For example, in India, any rights and power not defined in the Constitution are automatically vested in the center, whereas it is just the opposite in the case of US. A fiscal federalism, on the other hand, focuses on the funding mechanisms such as block grants and re-distributive formulas, and gives fiscal decision-making power to the local bodies without any strict central control. The proposed regional governance mechanism presented here is not the strict form of federalism. Any devolved form of decentralization system requires local governments with well-defined geographical boundaries and independent political decision-making power, which is accountable to the voting public, to exercise financial and management authority to perform well-matched public functions. Thus, while creating an institutional mechanism, numerous political and economic arguments must be taken into account such as: efficiency; direct voting and independent decision making mechanism; checks and balances and accountability; co-ordination and transaction costs; scope of the goods and externalities; carrying capacity and resource mobilization power; redistribution of wealth through equalization formulas; taxing power, and socio- economic and political history of the country. The regional governance proposed for Nepal fulfills many of these criteria, and it will be argued that the current unitary system with 75 districts has many flaws. The Proposed Regional Governance The proposed decentralized mechanism would preserve the constitutional monarchy and strengthen multiparty democracy, and it would not require any changes in our administratively-defined geographic units such as village councils, district units and development regions. The current constitutional provisions dealing with the monarchy, and legislative, executive and judicial power and responsibility would remain intact. Other changes would be required in the constitution, including:
A parallel judiciary system, which is not discussed here, needs to be worked on eventually to fit the proposed institutional mechanism. A constitutional provision is needed to devolve power to the regional government and reduce the functionality of the district-level entity in order to avoid and reduce duplication, conflicts, and the expenses of coordination. The Benefits The proposed decentralised political system encourages electoral participation and promotes accountability. And, under this system, the constitutional monarchy is actually strengthened. Strong regional governments would reduce the impact of national-level crises on ongoing development efforts outside the Valley much the same way as impeachment hearings in the United States did not impede the business of state level governments. Similarly, the national crises in New Delhi engross national legislators, but state governments move on with their economic growth and development plans. The regional jurisdiction is much better equipped to fight for the rights and responsibilities of the fifteen or so districts within each regional assembly. Under the current system, political bosses tend to take projects to their constituencies, often in eastern Nepal, and many weak districts in western Nepal get left out. The central government will also be more efficient in dealing with five regional governments rather than a host of highly heterogeneous and fragmented and fragile district units. Just to keep things in perspective, a vast country like the U.S. with a population of 250 million people has a three-tier system with 50 states and slightly over 3,000 counties. A typical county has just a hand full of representatives. Similarly, many other nations have taken a reasonable approach to their administrative structure to create a balance between the local units and the central authority (e.g., Canada: 10 provinces, Germany: 16 states, Malaysia: 13 states, Argentina: 23 provinces, Austria: 9 provinces, South Africa: 9 provinces, Italy: 20 regions, Brazil: 26 regions, and a highly populated 2 million sq. km. big Mexico with one hundred million population has 31 states) In addition, the provision of a direct voting mechanism ensures accountability, and puts into place checks and balances. The current district level government is not accountable to the people, because they are not elected directly. Five regional governments in a geographically challenged country like Nepal will work, especially in the context of growing regional sentiments vis-à-vis the centre of power, Kathmandu. Clarity of agenda is also a big plus. That is, voters may vote for a party and its candidates at the national level on the basis of issues of national importance such as SAARC and SAFTA, immigration policy, trade with India, water resources, national security, discrimination against Dalits and women, child labour, girl trafficking, information technology, income tax, and environmental damages and policies. At the same time, they may choose to be totally apolitical in the selection of their local, village-level leaders, and consider only their ability to look after local needs and issues such as law and order, sanitation, property taxes, health. Similarly, regional level voting preferences may be based on completely different issues, such as the nature of the regional universities, exploitation of water resources and mining, small hydro power, tourism, sales tax, property tax, business tax, emission standards, public school systems, feeder roads or healthcare. Federalism and political decentralisation would also help achieve equity across different regions within a country. The center and the regions can work out a revenue sharing formula with an understanding that once the center hands over a block-grant, the region can use its discretion to manage it. Such independence will also help the regional authority to look after more effectively the depressed local village units within its jurisdiction Division of Tasks After a thorough research, a clear division of power and responsibility must be spelled out, as some countries do, in the Constitution across the three layers of governments – center, regions, and villages. Center: defense, custom and import duties, postal, regional and international matters, citizenship, science and technology, highways, big dams, waterways, income taxes, VAT, airways, environmental regulation, public health and family planning, financial sector and policies, national parks, forest, lands, patents, agriculture research, mining, police etc. Regional: health, small and medium hydropower and distribution, autonomous universities, feeder roads, forest resources, tourism, motor vehicles registration, mining, regional parks and lands, sales taxes, business taxes, public schools, waterways, community forest, policing etc. Village: health post, elementary schools, property taxes, business registration fees, pathways, animal shelters, entertainment fees and duties, sanitation, water supplies, traffic, parking, local tourism etc. Countries like Canada and Italy have spelled out these tasks in their constitutions. An alternate approach would be to pass several by-laws after much research and negotiation. Why Regional Setup? Decentralization is a very complex issue and one should avoid using the one–size-fits-all approach. What may work for one country may not be appropriate for everywhere else. It inherently is a political process that requires a thorough assessment of political, institutional, and economic elements of a country in question. In addition to economic rationality, the structure and the degree of federalism sometimes depend on several other factors such as, ethnicity, language, population, and political geography. For example, the United Kingdom, originally a unitary system of government, has now slowly adopting a federal type system with regional level assemblies in its middle tier between counties and the national parliament. France, on the other hand, has four tiers, but it is a unitary system with a centralized authoritative power. Italy recently created 20 regions. Similarly, India adopted a federal system for the obvious reason of ethnic diversity, where as Mexico and Australia and, to some extent, vast Canada adopted a federal system for the reason of administrative efficiency. In Nepal, in addition to defining power and responsibility for each level of government with minimal ambiguity and duplication, the decentralization initiative must give priority in capturing regional sentiment by allowing regional level governments. Given the current rising regional sentiment and frustration, it is very important for Nepal to move towards a regional setup. It will create a much stronger regional voice, a source of advocacy for the local units, capable of defending their rights and responsibilities. Historically, political and economic debates in Nepal have been raised and fought from the point of view of regional sentiments (e.g., Western, Far Western, Eastern, and the Valley), and so it only makes sense to create regional governments with directly elected governors and legislative bodies to address the problem and pride of regional self-reliance. Without a regional structure as a viable political force and direct voting mechanism at all three levels of governments, the decentralization effort in Nepal is less likely to be successful. One could definitely come up with some alternate provincial structures counter to the proposed development regional mechanism. For example, a 2-Terai, 2-Hill and 1-Kathmandu structure can be proposed to advocate the sentiment of the Terai people, but 16 and even 35 other ethnically driven “States” can have an equally compelling argument to satisfy the ethnic emotions of our diverse population with 54 languages. Further, going down the ethnic route of 2-Terai and 2-Hill argument, there is a danger of lumping the Gurungs and the Magars with the Sherpas under a broad cultural brush, Hill people. Geographically dividing the country along the ethic route is both dangerous and counterproductive, especially for a small and highly diverse country like Nepal. Furthermore, the current regional structure mirrors our massive river basins such as, Mahakali and Seti in the Far West, Bheri and Rapti in the West, Karnali and Gandaki in the Mid-West and Kosi and Arun in the East. These river basins and the industrial development around them can spur economic growth and competition in the regions for the benefit of all. Any attempt to create provinces along the line of Hill versus Terai is also more likely to ignite fights over the same water resources. Such inter-boundary conflicts between the Terai and the Hills will raise transaction cost in any inter-state commerce in energy and irrigation and may undermine the racial harmony. Examples of such disputes over water resources can be found in the US and also in India. For example, litigation between Nebraska and Wyoming on the North Platte River took 15 years and two trips to the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve. Other examples of water battles include New Mexico-Texas, Washington-Idaho, and Georgia-Florida in the US. Some famous inter-state water disputes in India are over Godavari, Krishna, Narvada, Ravi and Beas, and Cauvery. The water tribunals have settled some cases while some are still pending. Within each regional state, the Teraibasis will have their fair share of representatives in the regional assemblies based on the population. Further, a mixed proportional representation system of election mechanism will also make sure that the popular votes cast for a party or ideals will not go wasted regardless of the location of the voters. A regional structure forces the Terai and the Hill to work together for the common economic interest The people from the Tarai will benefit from water resources coming down from the north, and will also enjoy benefits from tourism, husbandry, horticulture, forest resources, and mining opportunities. At the same time, the Hill people will be linked to industrial activities that are likely to take place in the plains. The bottom line is to empower the people so that they can chart their own destiny. The proposed mechanism with the regional setup cuts the bureaucratic chain of command and red-tape, and provides a unique platform under which the three levels of governments: (1) compete to be efficient, (2) align their incentives and coordinate when needed, (3) perform their prescribed tasks as required by law, (4) be accountable to their respective constituencies because of direct voting, (5) stand united on the issue of national security, and (6) provide a unified stronger voice for the local units and increase their bargaining power. Despite democracy’s triumph as a preferred political system, voters have begun to feel isolated and powerless against the coalition between the political machineries and the big business and lobbyists. In Nepal, the centralization of economic and political power has always been at work regardless of the systems of governments she has gone through. Now, with strong political parties being increasingly remote from the voters, especially from those outside the valley, only some select segments of the society and the districts have been the beneficiaries of our democracy. So, in addition to a devolved system of regional governments, this author proposes to reform our electoral process in favor a mixed form of proportional representation, MMP, with an intention of giving more voices to our ethnic and political minorities. Numerous countries around the world have sought answer by reforming or adopting new election mechanism. At the core of this, is the Westminster type of winner-take-all system (single-seat constituency currently used in Nepal), where a party with a small percent of the popular votes has a chance of controlling the government, thus leaving the other significant minorities helpless and frustrated Nepal’s one major political party commands the House with 38% of the popular votes, leaving 62% of the population on the sideline as minority. The two major political parties control almost 90% of the House seats with 70% of the popular votes. Further ethnically speaking, the Brahman and Chettris (30% of the total population) hold almost 70% of the House seats. Women’s representation is only about (6%), whereas the Dalits’s is almost negligible. Similarly, in 1997, the British Labor party got 63.4% of the seats with 43.2% of the popular vote. In a country like Nepal with an astounding ethnic diversity --Chettri=16.5%, Brahmin=12.9%, Magar=7.2, Tharu=6.5%, Newar=5.6%, Tamang=5.5, Kami=5.2, Rai=2.8%, Gurung=2.4, Limbu=1.6 etc.-- and growing resentment against the political establishment, this situation, what some describe as a political tyranny of majority, is a symbol of weak democracy. A country can never permanently sideline a vast majority of its ethnic and political minorities as well as women, and function as an effective democracy. In Nepal, the consequences of the concentration of economic and political power have already begun to surface: regional disparities, widening gap between rich and poor, rising corruption, violence, and many other social ills; some even attribute the insurgency to weak democracy. It begs the following question: Does it have to do with the way we elect our representatives? Many nations have sought the answer by choosing their political leaders based on a method known as the proportional representation (PR). In systems based on proportionality all votes end up counting towards the final results and are not wasted, provided that they cross a minimum threshold (5% vote or an electorate seat, for example, as used in New Zealand). Consequently, the PR system has gained much popularity in many countries all over the world (almost all of Europe, and many nations in Latin America, Africa, and Asia). Germany first implemented the PR system after the World War II. Whereas the Westminster system contests elections using a single-seat constituency principle (as in Nepal), the proportional representation allocates seats based on the party votes. The mixed system is the combination of the two, under which a percentage of the total votes is chosen using the single-seat constituency method, and the remaining seats are allocated using a proportional formula. The 50/50 mixed member proportion MMP method used in New Zealand is very popular and is used by countries such as, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Hungry. That is, the 50% of the seats are contested through the single-seat constituency, and the other 50% is allocated based on the percentage of the votes parties garner as a whole. Several have adopted a pure form of PR system too. In order to qualify for the vote allocation based on the party strength, some countries put some threshold value on the popular vote (e.g., 5%) to prevent the formation of insignificant parties. Some notable countries with the Westminster style winner-take-all method are US, Canada, India, and UK. Ironically, in the UK, regional assemblies of Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland use the PR method to elect their members, not the Westminster system. The United Kingdom sends its representatives to the European Union using the proportional representation system. Under the MPP system, a voter in a single-seat constituency casts two votes: one for a single candidate in the constituency and the other vote is cast for the party. The vote allocation part is carried out using the party vote cast in the entire nation or a region. The first vote acknowledges the candidate’s geographical attachment, but the second vote is for party ideology or to capture the sentiment of a group that may be scattered across the nation or the region. This two-vote system gives voters more power and choices and has many advantages. So, even if the single-constituency ticket were to be offered to the local influential patrons (e.g., Brahmin/Chettris males) for the purpose of winning the election, the party list may have to be diverse enough to garner wider support across the region to generate more party votes. This favors women and other dominant ethnic minorities. Many smaller parties, women, and numerous minority voices in Nepal will, in my judgment, welcome such a mechanism. The self-declared champion of the oppressed and the downtrodden –the Maoist Party— should also find it attractive, because this PR method will provide a strong voice for them as well. Under the proportional representation system, no one or two parties dominate the political landscape of the country, and the voters’ participation remains high. Various parties have to learn to cooperate and work as a team to set the common agenda. To bring some stability, the Norwegian parliamentary system does not allow dissolution of assembly during an election cycle. Other countries such as the US use the separation of power system to avoid any conflict of interest. Under this approach, the executive head is chosen directly from the people with a power to form the cabinet with experts who are not the members of the House. We too need some mechanism to bring about stability. After much debate and research, New Zealand changed its Westminster system in favor of a mixed proportional representation system (MMP) as recently as 1996 by way of a referendum. The political leadership in Nepal too should not be afraid of changes. An Illustrative Example of the Mixed Method An illustrative example showing the working of a MMP system with a 5% threshold is presented below. There are two ways to implement the mixed proportional system. The method number one begins with the calculation of the entitled seats for each party based on their popular votes. Consider, for example, there are seven parties (A, B, C, D, E, F, G) fighting to get into the Western regional assembly that holds 41 seats. As explained earlier, of the 41 seats, 21 seats will be contested at the constituency levels (electorate seats), and the remaining 20 will be distributed according to the percentage of the party votes. Each voter casts two ballots in the booth, of which one is for the single-seat constituency candidate, and the second is for the party list. Suppose that the electorate seats won by different parties that add up to 21 are as follows: A=12, B=5, C=3, D=1, E=0, F=0, G=0. Further, the last two parties, F and G, get only 4 and 3 percent of the popular votes in the region, and so they do not cross neither the 5% popular vote nor the at-least-one-electorate-seat criterion. Thus they are dropped from the vote allocation scheme. Party D with its 1 electorate seat, on the other hand, qualifies for the proportional share of the remaining seats based on the party performance. Using the votes cast for parties A through E only, the following voting percentages emerge: A = 38%, B=28%, C=22%, D=4%, and E=8%. Based on these new percentages, the “entitled” or “deserving seats” are calculated out of the total of 41 as follows: A = 38% of 41 = 16, B = 28% of 41 is 11, and similarly C = 9, D = 2, E = 3. The entitled party seats for A are 16 and they have won 12 electorate seats. So they deserve additional 4 seats from the party list to make it a total of sixteen. If they had won 18 electorate seats, more than the maximum cap of 16, they would not be getting any extra seats through the proportional allocation. But they would be allowed to keep the additional 2 seats. All other calculations are done similarly and the sum of the electorate and the party seats for all the qualifying parties are as follows: A: 12+4 = 16, B: 5+6 = 11, C: 3+6 = 9, D: 1+1 = 2, E: = 0+3 = 3. Notice that the party E with 0 electorate seat ends up with 3 representatives based on its overall performance. This is the power of the PR system. Under this electoral process, regionally scattered voices can band together and make a difference. In New Zealand, as a result of the newly chosen electoral process, women and the indigenous population and some ethnic minority have gotten stronger voices in the parliament through increased seats. Of course, we may see more coalition type governments in place as a result of this system, but having diverse voices in the decision making process is not necessarily a bad democracy. Parties are forced to work together, compromise, and be civil. A vast majority of democracies around the world has gone that route. Under this mechanism, the total assembly seats can exceed 41, especially if a party wins more than the deserving seats using the traditional single-seat constituency method. In such situations, the party keeps the surplus seats until the next election cycle. New Zealand uses this method. The second simpler method allocates the remaining 20 seats among the qualifying parties without imposing any upper cap. In this simple allocation, the total number of seats will not exceed 41. A similar mechanism can be applied to the national assembly. The total number of constituencies should be reduced in half to 103, and are contested through the traditional Westminster method. The remaining 102 seats are allocated through one of the two methods as explained above. At the national level, the party list of candidates can be prepared in one of the two ways. Since a national list can be quite long for the voters to comprehend, a shorter regional list may be more appropriate. Instead of the 50/50 mixed allocation, a 60/40 scheme can be used too, under which the 60% of the seats are elected using the traditional method of Westminster and the 40% is distributed according to the proportional representation method. Countries like Japan, Philippines, and Indonesia use much skewed mixed formulas Concluding Remarks Every democracy does have policy polarizations. We may desire certain common goals and welfare, but the tools to achieve them may be different across different political parties. Forcing others to adopt a set of policy tools is ridiculous and autocratic. Political forces with differing views and the civil society have to solve problems through debates and participation using the ideals of democracy and by compromising and respecting each other’s views. The question is about priority and compromises, and no one group or ideology should have a complete domination over the entire population. The current political system is closed, exclusive, and discourages participation. The proposed regional governance and a mixed proportional representation system of election empower a wider section of the society. With a system of increased shared responsibility in place, the civil society and a host of other political leaderships can engage in debates to curb corruption, think ways to exploit our hydro potential through regional cooperation, enhance tourism, spur regional growth, fix our social ills, produce skilled manpower through regional universities, improve health care, make decision regarding infrastructure, demand democracy and financial transparency in internal party affairs, seek relaxed regulations to promote economic freedom etc. The point is that without a wider participation through empowerment, the public policy debates on a score of these and other socio-economic issues will be moot. Democracy welcomes diversity and pluralism and, at the same time, makes the act of governing messy. It is flexible and allows changes. The public and the civic society should be vigilant and demanding. Democracy should be everybody’s business. Short BiographyDr. Alok K. Bohara is a professor of Economics at the University of New Mexico, U.S.A. He received his Masters and Ph.D. from the University of Colorado at Boulder. His Masters work in Statistics at the Tribhuvan University had earned him Mahendra Bidhya Bhushan and the Chancellor Medal. He has published on topics of wide interest: inflation uncertainty, wage discrimination, environmental Kuznet(s) curve, non-market valuation, environmental degradation and pollution. His research work has appeared in numerous U.S. and European peer-reviewed professional journals. His current research work is in the area of non-market valuation of public goods, poverty, political economy, corruption, political decentralization, democracy and violence. His pieces showing concern on higher education, corruption, political decentralization, and federalism in the context of Nepal have appeared in Nepali newspapers.
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